The reason to stop buying new hardware

Over the past few years, the most powerful models have been available to anyone with an API key and are steadily improving in performance.

Artifical Analysis showed that the best model available to the public is gaining ~19 points per year on their Intelligence Index, and the pace is only increasing. Epoch AI determined that the rate of improvement in frontier models has almost doubled since April 2024, scored using their Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI).^[3]

Frontier models are consistently getting better, but not as much research focuses on the idea that models are growing exponentially in capability at every size. The question many people should be asking: How much hardware does it take to reproduce a level of intelligence once it exists?

In March 2023, achieving GPT-4-level capability required an estimated 1.8 trillion parameters.^[4] In July 2026, fitting GPT-4-level capability can fit in a model with around 14 billion parameters. This is a model ~129x smaller in size, requiring vastly less compute than before.

Other model benchmarks follow similar trends. o1-level capability fell from 671 billion parameters to 25 billion in eleven months, and o3-level capability went from roughly a trillion to 27 billion within a single month of open models reaching it at all.

This is a regular enough occurrence now that some researchers have named it the "densing law": the capability obtainable per parameter is doubling roughly every three and a half months.^[5]

Figure 1 shows intelligence climbing on the left axis, the parameters required for fixed intelligence falling down the right. You can click on each data point for the source.

The wait between a capability debuting at the frontier and fitting in a workstation-class model (35 billion parameters or fewer) is also decreasing:

From an economics perspective, serving a fixed level of capability gets roughly 10× cheaper per year.^[7] When measured benchmark by benchmark, it can be anywhere between 9× and 900× per year, with a median near 50×.^[8]

Some of that decline is coming from better models (3x per year), while the rest comes from a combination of better hardware optimization and providers competing on margins.^[9]

Hardware is a tricky asset to account for, as current demand has caused hardware prices to rise, yet some hardware has also depreciated in price over the last few years. H100s that sold for roughly $40,000 in late 2023 now at $7,000–$20,000, a 50-82.5% loss.^[10]

You could look at this from the angle that buying hardware is purchasing a depreciating asset. However, another angle is that if you bought an H100 in 2023, you now own hardware capable of running better, newer, and denser models over time. Its financial value may have fallen, but its practical utility has technically increased. That said, it doesn't capture future declines in hardware prices nor provider margins decreasing.

It's also a strong argument for organizations which already own hardware. If a sufficient model fits on hardware you already own, you gain the benefits of better local models that make older hardware more useful over time without the capex of new hardware at inflated prices.

That leaves a separate question: when does buying new hardware make more economic sense than renting?

It likely depends on how much time you think your compute will be sitting idle. If you can keep the hardware busy more than 50–83% of the time, it may be smarter to own it than pay a provider.^[15]

However, over a four-year horizon, with the API price falling tenfold yearly and the owner capturing sixty percent of that curve through model swaps, breakeven climbs to 88% sustained utilization.

You can test this out in Figure 2. The defaults are the observed values we have found. If you set deflation 1× (i.e. assuming prices do not fall), the model gives the standard total-cost-of-ownership result found in other research.

The bet to buy hardware is sensible under the right assumptions. It is also separate from the decision to use hardware you already own, where the acquisition cost has already been paid.

The question most organizations should be asking is: for the capability of model we want to deploy, can we run it on the hardware we already own or plan to acquire?

Epoch suggests the amount of time for a model to go from frontier to workstation-capable is around 6-12 months, with small models improving faster than the frontier itself^[16]. Our own tier data suggests that this timeframe has also compressed from sixteen months to just seven in under 2 years.

The authors of the densing law warn against extrapolating indefinitely, and it's impossible to do so accurately.^[5] You should hold the results from Figure 3 loosely, as they provide data based on if current trends persist.

Based on our research, we think that soon there are only going to be two real options: own the trailing edge, or rent the frontier.

For most organizations, whether it's now or at some point in the future, owning the trailing edge (i.e. doing inference on older, open frontier models locally) is going to be a sensible bet. Local models are closing in on the point where they are good enough for a lot users, and come with benefits which can't necessarily be priced into the economic side of things.

By owning the silicon and running your own models you gain sovereignity, privacy, and control. Terms and conditions can change, pricing plans can change, and although the cost of tokens is decreasing, net usage is trending upwards which could lead to larger costs. Be wary of hardware currently being overbought, and use what you already own where possible.

For those who want or need the most powerful models and don't mind the cons, rent frontier intelligence. API pricing is currently one of the fastest deflating costs in the AI economy, and pay-as-you-go can be more efficient for smaller workloads. Count it as the capex it is.

Full disclosure: Cascadia is building distributed inference runtimes across fleets of Intel AI PCs that organizations already own. We are betting on this thesis because we believe on-prem AI and hybrid setups are the future because of the cost and data privacy advantages. That being said, the data is the data. We encourage you to form your own conclusions.

1. [1]Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index v4.1, retro-scored leaderboard. Snapshot of July 16, 2026 via the BenchLM mirror; interactive original at artificialanalysis.ai/models. benchlm.ai
2. [2]Artificial Analysis, “AI Trends” — frontier intelligence over time; intelligence vs. total and active parameters. artificialanalysis.ai
3. [3]Epoch AI, “AI capabilities progress has sped up” (Dec 2025) — frontier slope 8.3 → 15.5 ECI points/year, breakpoint April 2024. epoch.ai
4. [4]Ege Erdil, “Frontier language models have become much smaller,” Epoch AI Gradient Update (Dec 2024) — the ~1.8T-parameter GPT-4 estimate. epoch.ai
5. [5]Xiao et al., “Densing law of LLMs,” Nature Machine Intelligence 7, 1823–1833 (2025) — capability density doubles every ~3.5 months. nature.com
6. [6]Sturb & LawrenceC, “Sanity-checking Incompressible Knowledge Probes” (May 2026) — densification is flat for parametric factual recall. lesswrong.com
7. [7]Appenzeller, “Welcome to LLMflation,” a16z (Nov 2024) — cost at equivalent capability falls ~10× per year. a16z.com
8. [8]Epoch AI, “LLM inference prices have fallen rapidly but unequally across tasks” — 9–900× per year at fixed benchmark scores; median ~50×. epoch.ai
9. [9]Gundlach et al., “The Price of Progress,” MIT FutureTech (2025) — algorithmic efficiency contributes ~3×/yr of the ~5–10×/yr total price decline; frontier-model prices are themselves rising. arxiv.org
10. [10]Used-market H100 pricing, 2026 — 60–80% value loss within roughly two years of purchase. compute.exchange
11. [11]Cast AI production telemetry across 23,000 clusters (2026) — mean enterprise GPU utilization ~5%; survey work finds 83% of firms at or below 50%. venturebeat.com
12. [12]IDC, AI infrastructure spending (Mar 2026) — $487B forecast for 2026; cloud and shared environments at 84–87% of the total. idc.com
13. [13]Combined 2026 capital-expenditure guidance of Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta: ~$725B, up 77% year over year. tomshardware.com
14. [14]Oracle Q4 FY2026 results — remaining performance obligations of $638B (+363%), of which $75B is customer-prepaid or customer-supplied GPUs. s23.q4cdn.com
15. [15]Published own-vs-rent TCO analyses, 2026 — breakeven at 50–83% sustained utilization before accounting for deflation. digitalapplied.com
16. [16]Somala & Emberson, “Frontier AI performance becomes accessible on consumer hardware within a year,” Epoch AI (2025) — consumer-GPU models lag the frontier by 6–12 months and improve faster than it. epoch.ai
17. [17]SemiAnalysis, “The Great GPU Shortage” (2026) — one-year H100 contract prices rose 40% between October 2025 and March 2026; capacity booked out through late summer. newsletter.semianalysis.com
18. [18]MIT NANDA, “The GenAI Divide” (Aug 2025) — 95% of enterprise generative-AI pilots show no measurable P&L return. fortune.com
19. [19]AI Futures Project, “AI 2027” and “AI 2040: Plan A” — scenario forecasts in which automated AI research produces superintelligence within the current hardware cycle. ai-2027.com
20. [20]Artificial Analysis, “Four frontier launches in eight days” (Jul 2026) — six labs now field a model above 50 on the index, up from two in early June; the leader’s margin is one point. artificialanalysis.ai
21. [21]Synergy Research Group, “Hyperscale Operators to Account for 67% of all Data Center Capacity by 2031” (2026) — on-premise share of world capacity 56% (2018) → 32% (Q4 2025) → 19% forecast (2031); the GenAI “boost” quote appears in the same release. srgresearch.com
22. [22]U.S. Census Bureau, Value of Construction Put in Place (C30), private data-center category — monthly series 2014–2026, mirrored as open data by Our World in Data. ourworldindata.org
23. [23]U.S. Census Bureau, Monthly Construction Spending, April 2026 (released June 1, 2026) — private data-center construction at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of ~$50.7B; the monthly series above is unadjusted and predates the May revisions. census.gov

Written July 2026. Intelligence scores are Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index v4.1 retro-scores (snapshot July 16, 2026); parameter counts are from model cards and technical reports, with estimates marked as such. The interactive figures contain the complete models; there are no additional assumptions off the page.